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Letting ‘the People(s)’ Decide: Peace Referendums and Power-Sharing Settlements  
 
Abstract 
Referendums are increasingly used to legitimate power-sharing settlements in deeply divided 
societies transitioning from violent conflict. This article assesses the use of the referendum to 
legitimate power sharing, focusing on the capacity of referendum rules to facilitate the ‘voice’ of 
multiple groups or ‘peoples’ engaged in a ‘constitutional moment.’ Drawing on the constitutional 
referendums in Northern Ireland in 1998 and Iraq in 2005, I demonstrate that referendum rules matter 
in highlighting the variable degrees of support for the elite-negotiated deal on the part of the 
contending groups. The institutional design process prior to the referendum is crucial for incentivising 
groups to support the settlement, particularly the previously dominant group. When faced with a 
choice between a simple majority threshold and countermajoritarian procedures, majoritarianism is 
appropriate only in so far as the main groups see their constitutional preferences satisfied and 
concurrent majorities can be secured. A qualified majority referendum threshold to protect a minority 
groups is appropriate for divided states where the groups are regionally concentrated and when the 
groups agree to such rules. 
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‘This is the result we have worked for and wanted. It’s another giant stride along the 
path to peace, hope and the future.’  
 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on the Northern Ireland 1998 referendum result1  
 
‘There’s still a lot of difficult work to do in Iraq. But thanks to the courage of the Iraqi 
people, the year 2005 will be recorded as a turning point in the history of Iraq, the 
history of the Middle East and the history of freedom.’  
 
US President George W. Bush on the Iraq 2005 referendum and subsequent elections2  
 
Introduction  
As these optimistic pronouncements from Tony Blair and George W. Bush attest, political leaders are 
at pains to frame a positive referendum result on constitutional reform in states transitioning from 
conflict as a significant step toward peace. The referendums in Northern Ireland and Iraq paved the 
way for cross-community power sharing, widely recognized as a useful framework to enhance the 
prospects for peace and democracy in deeply divided societies.3 Institutional rules that provide for 
joint-decision making between groups, power sharing is favoured by both international mediators and 
political elites seeking guarantees of access to power. Power-sharing pacts have increasingly been 
put to a popular vote from Burundi to Cyprus, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and South Africa. 
Referendums on power sharing form part of the 'new wave of "direct constitutional democracy"' in 
the founding of new states; the revision of constitutions or creation of new ones; the establishment of 
sub-state autonomy; and in the transfer of power from the state to international organizations.4 
Referendums are held in the expectation that a positive vote will shore up support for constitutional 
change on the part of the population at large. Enjoying such a reservoir or platform of popular support, 
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it is assumed that peace settlements (including power-sharing agreements) have a good chance of 
achieving political stability.  
 
A relatively under-explored political phenomenon, constitutional/ethnonational referendums have 
received increased attention from scholars in comparative politics, international relations, 
constitutional theory and conflict resolution. Some scholars argue that the referendum is inappropriate 
in divided societies where the zero-sum outcome risks inflaming inter-communal relations and can 
trigger violence.5 Others are more optimistic about the prospects of ethnonational referendums. In a 
study of all referendums on ethnic/nationalist issues since the French Revolution to 2012, Matt 
Qvortrup finds that referendums result in peaceful solutions when groups agree to hold a referendum 
and the international community accepts the result.6 The referendum has also been shown to enable 
elites to pre-empt ethnic outbidding and maximize their credibility in reaching a political settlement.7 
These debates highlight the question of whether referendums ride roughshod over the wishes of 
minority groups. For Arend Lijphart, the father of power-sharing theory, the referendum is 'a blunt 
majoritarian instrument that may well be used against minorities.'8 Potential exclusion of minority 
groups in constitution-making has been described as ‘a profound issue and potentially the greatest 
stumbling block for referendum democracy.'9 This unresolved puzzle is particularly pertinent for the 
use of the referendum to legitimate power-sharing premised on minority inclusion and group 
guarantees. In a process of institutional design predicated on inclusive decision-making along group 
lines, the application of the referendum appears to contradict the essence of power sharing. An 
accommodationist strategy for managing diversity, power sharing seeks to ensure that each group 
‘has the public space necessary for it to express its identity, to protect itself against tyranny by the 
majority, and to make its own decisions in domains of critical importance.'10 It is intriguing, then, 
that the referendum is increasingly used to legitimate power sharing given its overarching 
accommodationist commitment to the recognition and protection of group identity. 
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This article assesses the use of the referendum to legitimate power-sharing democracy in deeply 
divided societies. I explore whether and how referendum design can facilitate the voice of multiple 
groups in the ratification of power sharing. If we lack a full understanding of the dynamics of 
referendum design in transitions to power sharing, minority groups may find themselves in a polity 
they perceive to be both illegitimate and in favour of the majority. Further intra-communal 
antagonism and the risk of recurring conflict could threaten a fragile political bargain reached by 
elites. Exploring the value of referendums is therefore important for the stability and legitimacy of 
peacebuilding.11 The article proceeds in four parts. First, I connect the literature on power sharing, 
legitimacy, and the demonstration of popular consent via the referendum. Second, I consider how the 
notion of 'we the people' has implications for referendum design, particularly in relation to simple 
majority approval or countermajoritarian rules. Third, I illustrate how different referendum rules 
played out in two contemporary cases, Northern Ireland (with respect to the referendums on the Good 
Friday Agreement) and Iraq (with respect to the referendum on the 2005 Constitution). Finally, I 
conclude that when the referendum is used in deeply divided societies, the outcome has significant 
implications for the legitimacy of the deal. Referendum rules matter because they throw into sharp 
relief 'the people' dilemma whereby multiple groups as 'peoples' are collectively engaged in a 
'constitutional moment'. Viewed positively, the referendum has the potential to facilitate the 'voice' 
of groups in such a way that they share constitutional authorship of the deal to transition to power 
sharing, thereby enhancing legitimacy. Yet the referendum will likely show that groups have variable 
degrees of support for the deal; the agreement may be more legitimate for one group (the previously 
excluded group) than another (the previously dominant group). Much depends on whether the main 
groups are sufficiently satisfied that their constitutional preferences are addressed. Highlighting these 
dynamics, I offer some lessons of potential use to policymakers working on constitutional design and 
the ratification of peace agreements. 
 
Power sharing, legitimacy and consent via the referendum  
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Groups' support for power-sharing democracy is arguably central to political stability. The decision 
to set up power-sharing institutions usually derives from a compromise between the contending 
groups and protracted peace talks. Moving to power sharing is about transforming a political system 
viewed by one or more groups as illegitimate to one in which the main groups see their interests 
protected and wish to maintain. Political legitimacy, then, is at the core of power-sharing theory. 
Going back to Lijphart's investigation of the paradox of Dutch politics (i.e. democratic stability 
despite mutually reinforcing social cleavages), central to stability is the groups' desire to maintain the 
system. For Lijphart, in the absence of a comprehensive political consensus among groups, there must 
nevertheless be 'a minimum of agreement on fundamentals...the crucial component of a widely shared 
attitude that the existing system ought to be maintained.’ 12  In the wider comparative politics 
literature, David Easton proposed the concept of diffuse support understood as citizens' 'generalized 
attachment' to the regime as a whole.13 As Pippa Norris notes, diffuse support is ‘important for 
stability in fragile states emerging from deep-rooted internal conflict, as well as for processes of 
regime transition, by strengthening popular acceptance of the legitimacy of new constitutional 
arrangements and the authority of officeholders.'14 Drawing on Lijphart's earlier work and the wider 
comparative politics literature, power-sharing stability is likely enhanced when citizens and groups 
wish the system to be maintained, that they regard the system as legitimate.  
 
The legitimation of a power-sharing agreement or constitution might be left to communal elites 
engaged in negotiations. Elites are, after all, expected to act on behalf of their respective community, 
particularly when they secure a seat at negotiations by virtue of an electoral mandate. In many cases, 
peace settlements are the outcome of elite bargaining with politicians seeking to 'sell' the deal to their 
communities. In the case of Northern Ireland, the presence of brokers (communal elites who were 
able to build a winning coalition for a settlement and marginalize spoilers) helped legitimate the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998.15 The role of political elites in encouraging their constituents’ support is, 
of course, key for securing popular support. In the case of Cyprus, although the main Greek Cypriot 
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and Turkish Cypriot parties initially supported the UN's 2004 Annan Plan, the deal was rejected by 
76 per cent of Greek Cypriots while 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots approved it in simultaneous 
referendums, the rejection largely owing to the Greek Cypriot party AKEL's 'last minute volte-face.'16 
There are also caveats to be made about treating elites as the legitimate representation of communities 
and 'legitimators' of a settlement. In the complex political space of peace negotiations, elites may be 
more interested in securing their own self-interests including power and rent-seeking opportunities. 
Leaders' goals may even conflict with the groups they purport to represent, given the incentives to 
avoid punishment ranging from 'loss of power, exile, imprisonment, or death.'17  
 
Despite, or in addition to, the expected role of elites to act as 'legitimators' of a settlement, 
international actors increasingly recommend that constitutional reform should be put to the people 
via consultation or ultimately in the form of a referendum. In the wider literature on statebuilding, 
scholars call for high levels of public participation so that the constitution better reflects the public's 
views and that such a process 'may assist in building a sense of political community, so that people 
unite to exercise their constituent power.'18 Drawing from central tenets of democracy theory, we can 
posit that the legitimation of peace settlements is enhanced when citizens consent. Within the social 
contract tradition, a Lockean view holds that 'Political power is morally legitimate, and those subject 
to it are morally obligated to obey, only where that power continues to be exercised within the terms 
of the consent given.'19 Legitimacy is conferred on authority through actions that publicly express 
citizens’ consent.20 In modern liberal democracies, the electoral process performs this function.21 
Moreover, the referendum is widely accepted by states as a mechanism to demonstrate popular 
consent on a significant political issue.22 The exercise of popular sovereignty through democratic 
means is regarded as a 'global normative entitlement'23 and has informed peacebuilding for some 
time. Voting in a referendum therefore provides citizens in transitional societies with the opportunity 
to consent (or not) to the proposed constitutional reform. Yet in a society with deep ethnonational 
cleavages, the referendum is not so straightforward. 
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‘We the People’ in Deeply Divided Societies and Referendum Rules for Minority Inclusion  
The use of the referendum invokes the voice of 'the people' in consenting to a peace agreement or 
constitutional reform that will establish core political institutions. Since the shift from the notion of 
divine right of kings to popular sovereignty in Anglo-American democratic transitions, popular 
sovereignty has worked to legitimate and sustain democratic government.24 But in our pluralistic 
world, and particularly in situations of deep ethnonational cleavages, ‘the notion of a sovereign people 
acting on one will and speaking in one voice is inevitably met with suspicion.'25 Indeed, the notion of 
'the people' raises the question 'who are the people?', a particularly thorny issue in deeply divided 
societies given ongoing tensions over identity, territory and groups' access to power. Surprisingly, 
relatively little research has been undertaken on the relationship between 'the people' and 
constitutional reform in divided societies.26 To negotiate the problem of identifying ‘the people’, a 
tradition in political philosophy has lent on the notion of ‘hypothetical consent’ which rests on a 
generalization about what ‘the people’ would want if acting rationally. 27 Yet such generalizations in 
the name of ‘the people’ cannot speak for multiple ethnonational groups and risk speaking in the 
name of the dominant group and excluding others. Moving away from an abstract notion of ‘the 
people’, we can posit that political legitimacy is enhanced by securing people’s actual consent. 
Granted, the notion of actual consent is flawed in so far as it is impossible that any political institution 
would be supported by all citizens. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of political legitimacy, it is important 
for institutional designers in post-conflict transitions to consider how people might have 'a say in their 
own voices about the form and principles of their own political organization.'28 As Tierney writes, 
from a popular republican position, ‘the people of a polity ought to be directly involved in 
constitutional decision-making, particularly at constitutive moments.'29 The challenge appears to be 
how such processes in institutional design might be based on inclusion, what Simone Chambers calls 
‘the democratization of popular sovereignty.’30  
 
 8 
 
If we accept it is important to include groups in institutional design, and in the popular ratification of 
an elite-negotiated deal, how do we get round the problem of identifying ‘the people’? Identifying 
‘the people’ is particularly problematic in divided societies where ethnonational groups have 
divergent self-determination claims; it can be more appropriate to talk of ‘peoples’ rather than ‘the 
people.’ For Brendan O'Leary, power-sharing theorists are necessarily 'sensitive to the nature of the 
demos or demoi' in a deeply divided place.31 As John McGarry notes, when divisions between groups 
in a divided polity runs along ethnonational lines reflecting divergent self-determination claims, 
groups may have 'claims to partnerships between peoples within central governments', sometimes 
accompanied by 'intense claims to territorial self-government, the recognition of their national 
symbols and institutional links with co-nationals in other states.' 32  When constitutional reform 
involves such partnerships in government, the referendum therefore constitutes a 'constitutional 
moment' for the affected groups. 33  Constitutional moments in divided societies are high-stakes 
transformative events given that constitutions in such places 'constitute the very demos which governs 
itself under and through the constitutional regime.' 34  Characterizing a referendum on a new 
constitution or peace agreement as part of a 'constitutional moment', we need to better consider how 
the voice of the groups or ‘peoples’ can be facilitated in the decision to be governed together in a 
power-sharing polity.35  
 
The need to facilitate the voice of groups in the ratification of power sharing seemingly sits at odds 
with the referendum's use of majoritarian rules. After all, referendum results are usually decided by 
a simple majority threshold of 50 per cent plus 1. When there are two options available to voters (vote 
‘yes’ or ‘no’), a simple majority is seemingly straightforward. As Buchanan and Tullock write, 
‘Whenever a choice has to be made only a decision made by a simple majority will ensure that more 
are satisfied by the result than are frustrated.’36 But those left frustrated might have been excluded 
from power for some time and suffered discrimination or oppression. A simple majority threshold 
risks privileging the majority, thereby excluding the minority community and ultimately failing to 
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legitimate the deal reached by elites. Imposing the will of the majority on the minority flies in the 
face of power-sharing principles. As Lijphart argues, in plural societies, ‘majority rule spells majority 
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy.’37 If a majority group can override the wishes of 
the minority in a referendum, the minority’s right to self-determination will be denied. Imposing a 
constitutional decision on a dissenting minority against its wishes is hardly a promising scenario for 
peace and stability.  
 
To counter the potentially negative effects of a simple majority threshold, referendums can draw on 
countermajoritarian procedures to protect minorities and facilitate the voice of the main communities. 
Broadly speaking, countermajoritarian procedures aim to protect the rights and interests of minority 
groups against potential infringement by the majority.38 Such procedures are arguably required when 
the referendum acts as a constitutional moment, thereby necessitating a high level of popular 
support. 39 To secure concurrent majorities of the groups rather than the majority, referendum rules 
could opt for a qualified majority requiring a high level of support across groups (difference-blind in 
keeping with liberal consociation) or explicit approval of each of the main communities (as 'pre-
determined' groups and in keeping with corporate consociation).40 This liberal/corporate distinction 
has been applied to rules for concurrent majority decision-making in power-sharing legislatures. 
Concurrent majorities can be realized via ‘corporate naming (or "designation") of the peoples' or 
'implicitly through a difference-blind qualified majority decision-making rule' such as a weighted 
majority threshold (e.g. two-thirds).41 Given the impossibility of acquiring unanimous support in a 
high-stakes peace referendum, concurrent majority rules would approximate ‘the ‘will of the peoples’ 
in a divided society transitioning to power sharing.  
To secure a liberal weighted majority, the challenge lies in deciding the appropriate threshold figure 
which will depend on the relative size of the groups, necessitating sufficient support from the minority 
and majority groups. In the Montenegro 2006 referendum, approval of independence required a 
relatively low 55 per cent of those eligible to vote.42 Liberal referendum rules are commonly used in 
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federations as per the Swiss case where approval requires a double majority of more than 50 per cent 
of votes in the country and a majority of votes in a majority of the cantons. It is also possible for 
concurrent majorities to be achieved in the referendum via corporate naming of the groups. Tierney 
refers to the possibility of implementing such rules whereby voters would register as a member of a 
particular community and the outcome would make explicit the relative support of each community.43 
Requiring explicit concurrent majorities may encourage elites to hold a referendum when confident 
that cross-communal support is forthcoming given the potential of one community to veto.44 In the 
case of the 2004 referendum in Cyprus, two simultaneous referendums took place to ascertain the 
consent of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to proposals for reunification of 
the island.45 There are, however, potential drawbacks to rules for determining concurrent majorities 
between groups. As O'Leary points out, 'Ceding parity for decisions is the most difficult power-
sharing principle to accept for the representatives and negotiators of a people with a large or 
significant majority.' 46  Agreement on concurrent majority rules would be difficult to achieve. 
Concurrent majority rules (particularly corporate rules that name the groups) may well entrench the 
identity of groups to approve constitutional change, thereby heightening division. Such rules may 
also infringe the rights of minorities and individuals outside the main communities.  
The protection of minority groups via countermajoritarian procedures invites the counter argument 
concerning 'tyranny of the minority.' Supermajoritarian requirements are considered minority vetoes 
because they allow a minority to block the will of the majority. Such rules violate the fundamental 
democratic principle of political equality, one person, one vote. For Robert Dahl, an ideal democracy 
involves, among other things, equality in voting.47 Majority rule is preferred as the best way to ensure 
that citizens are treated as equals at the ballot box.48 Reservations about the use of supermajority rules 
have also been considered in relation to federalism. Al Stepan has questioned the legitimacy of such 
arrangements whereby supermajority rules and overrepresentation in the upper house could mean that 
‘legislators representing less than 10 per cent of the electorate are able to thwart the wishes of the 
vast majority.’ 49  In the growing literature on ethnonational referendums, there appears to be a 
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preference for a simple majority threshold provided that a majority of eligible and registered voters 
cast their ballot.50   
 
Debates on individual political equality versus group rights have been addressed by power-sharing 
theorists. To criticism from liberal theorists, O'Leary replies that advocates of consociation 'invoke 
necessity and realism to challenge the confidence of liberals in majoritarian and adversarial 
democracy.' Consociationalists advocate democracy allowing for 'majorities – rather than the 
majority or the plurality – to control or influence government.' 51  Christopher McCrudden and 
Brendan O'Leary suggest that consociation involves a clash between two different understandings of 
equality. Whereas the majoritarian conception of equality is constrained by consociation, 
‘consociationalists seek to further equality between the consociated peoples or groups. They do not 
presume that there is one demos, certainly not the type of demos in which majority rule would be 
legitimate.'52 Power sharing approved in a referendum with concurrent consent of the main groups is 
considered to enjoy enhanced legitimacy.53 Notably, existing consociational rules provide for the 
overrepresentation of a group, thereby conflicting with the principle of individual political equality. 
Thibaud Bodson and Neophytos Loizides explore the 'protective dis-proportional representation' of 
the Dutch-speaking community in the Brussels Capital Region. A minority in Brussels (though a 
majority in the country as a whole), the Dutch-speaking community is protected by a concurrent 
majority rule in the legislature, veto powers, the organisation of parliament into two language groups 
and parity of government portfolios with the French-speaking community. This over-representation 
of a minority group is argued to be justified in the pursuit of stability and peaceful inter-communal 
relations.54 Drawing on these debates, and to shed light on the practical implications of whether 
referendum rules can facilitate the voice of multiple groups or peoples in a constitutional moment, I 
turn to explore the use of the referendum to legitimate power sharing in two contemporary cases, 
Northern Ireland and Iraq.  
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Managing 'the peoples' in two power-sharing referendums: Northern Ireland and Iraq 
Northern Ireland 
A crucial case in the history of ethnonational referendums, Northern Ireland's Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 (GFA) was 'the first consociational pact to have been immediately popularly 
endorsed in a referendum.'55 Following years of failed political initiatives, the Agreement reached 
between political parties and the British and Irish governments is founded on popular support 
demonstrated in two simultaneous and mutually dependent referendums held in Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland on 22 May 1998. The GFA is said to represent 'a new constitutional beginning 
with its origins very clearly in ideas of consent and popular sovereignty.'56 With a high turnout of 
81.1% in Northern Ireland, 71.1% voted 'yes' to approval of the Agreement and 28.9% voted 'no.'57 
The referendum in the Republic of Ireland asked voters to approve revisions to Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Irish Constitution, thereby abandoning the state’s claim to territorial integrity of the island.58 On 
a turnout of 56%, 94.4% voted in favour of constitutional change as an essential part of the ratification 
of the Agreement. 
The referendum result can arguably be explained by the extent to which the Agreement addresses the 
two groups' self-determination claims and creates a binational polity in which both 
nationalists/republicans and unionists/loyalists can govern the polity together. Notably, the largest 
parties of the two communities engaged in the talks were the more ‘moderate’ Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP). For nationalists led by the SDLP, power 
sharing in Northern Ireland was to be bolstered by the North-South Ministerial Council and cross-
border bodies, the 'Irish dimension.' For unionists, the Agreement secured the 'consent principle' ( 
Northern Ireland's constitutional status would not change without majority approval in the region), 
established east-west institutions across the UK and promised an end to IRA violence.59 Standing 
somewhat apart from the negotiations, republicans led by Sinn Féin voted to support the deal as 
transitional to a future united Ireland.60 The political representatives of the loyalist community, the 
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Progressive Unionist Party, supported the Agreement as a means to embed ‘shared responsibility’ 
and the expression of more class-based politics.61  
 
The Northern Ireland referendum highlighted the variable support for the Agreement on the part of 
the two main groups. Though there was no official breakdown by constituency, a Sunday Times exit 
poll found that 96 per cent of Catholics had voted in favour with a much smaller majority of 55 per 
cent of Protestants doing so.62 The 28.9% of the population who voted 'no' thus appeared to reflect 
unionist concerns. The Catholic nationalist community was almost wholly in favour but the Protestant 
community was deeply divided with a narrow majority subsequently declining to a minority just two 
years later. 63 Some argue that UUP Leader David Trimble had fought a 'defensive' referendum 
campaign given party tensions over the Agreement 64  and others suggest that Trimble had 
underestimated the 'No' Campaign by the DUP and UKUP 'which tapped into unionist fears about 
prisoners, policing and decommissioning.'65 The British government took some comfort from the 
indication that even though the result 'was scarcely a resounding triumph on the unionist side…at 
least we could claim that a majority of Protestants had voted yes.'66  
 
In terms of rules, the Northern Ireland referendum adopted a simple majority threshold and there was 
no requirement for concurrent majorities of the two main communities.67 We can speculate that had 
a clear unionist majority voted 'no', the UUP would have been devastated in the June Assembly 
elections and the prospects for the GFA would have been in serious jeopardy.68 It is not likely the 
parties and the two governments would have supported a countermajoritarian procedure to 
demonstrate a concurrent majority either in the form of a qualified majority or corporate rules 
requiring voters to register as a member of a particular community. Though the Agreement includes 
corporate rules whereby Members of the Legislative Assembly register as 'nationalist', 'unionist' or 
'other', it arguably would have been inappropriate to apply such categories to the electorate and 
unlikely that the parties would have agreed to such a move. A simple majority threshold was 
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appropriate because the Agreement sufficiently addressed the groups' self-determination aspirations. 
The inclusive peace process and 'constructive ambiguity' of the deal allowed nationalists, republicans, 
unionists and loyalists to view the GFA as securing their constitutional preferences. Of additional 
note is that political parties and wider civil society employed robust public relations efforts to 
persuade the public to vote ‘yes.’69 Converse to considerations of potential majority hegemony in 
referendums, the Northern Ireland case shows the need to make sure the previously dominant majority 
community is incentivised to vote 'yes'. The two referendums were also notable as an instance of 
direct constitutional democracy requiring concurrent majorities in two jurisdictions, acknowledging 
various demoi on the island. 
 
The variation in groups' support constrained the implementation of the deal, largely owing to unionist 
reservations about sharing power with republicans in advance of IRA decommissioning. But the GFA 
is also a story of increased support for power sharing by a previously dominant group who were 
cautious in their initial support.70 Peace implementation and increased stabilization are linked to the 
moderation of the DUP who had campaigned for a 'no' vote in 1998 but took their seats in the power-
sharing executive created a year later and became the largest unionist party in 2003. Having outbid 
the UUP, the DUP continued to moderate, simultaneously critiquing the Agreement and presenting 
itself as a governing party, moving from a party of protest to one of power.71 Following the party's 
acceptance of revisions to the Agreement proposed by the two governments in the St Andrews 
Agreement of 2006 and gains at the 2007 Assembly election, the DUP agreed to enter an executive 
with Sinn Féin as the largest parties of each bloc.72 Despite a series of political crises, the executive 
led by the DUP and Sinn Féin from 2007 until its collapse in 2017 ushered in a period of relative 
stability. Electoral competition evolved over time from contestation over whether to share power to 
parties positioning themselves as the most 'effective voice' for their respective community.73 
 
Iraq 
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The constitutional design process in post-invasion Iraq took place in a very different context to the 
peace process and negotiations that led to the GFA in Northern Ireland. Despite important political 
and security differences, the use of the referendum to ratify a new constitutional order in Iraq further 
illuminates the challenge of facilitating the ‘voice’ of various groups in a referendum. The referendum 
held on 15 October 2005 ratified a new constitution encompassing an asymmetrical federation 
(including recognition of Kurdistan) and power sharing at the federal level according to liberal 
consociational rules.74 On a turnout of 61 per cent, the constitution was approved by 79 per cent of 
voters overall with Kurds and Shi’a Arabs overwhelmingly in favour and Sunni Arabs 
overwhelmingly opposed.75 The referendum rules were notable for introducing a qualified majority 
procedure whereby ratification required approval by a majority of voters in Iraq and if two-thirds of 
the voters in three or more governorates did not reject it.76 Despite the large overall majority, the vote 
came close to a Sunni Arab veto.77 
 
To what extent did the referendum sufficiently facilitate the voice of the Kurds, Shi’a Arabs and 
Sunni Arabs in determining their constitutional future? The requirement for the constitution to be 
popularly ratified can be traced to the efforts of the Kurdish elites who sought to shape the interim 
constitution imposed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in March 2004, the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL). O’Leary writes that the proposals from the Kurdistan National Assembly 
included a requirement that a permanent constitution would require majority approval in the 
Kurdistan Region.78 A very different proposal was proposed by a Sunni Arab member of the CPA-
appointed Iraqi Governing Council and chair of the Drafting Committee, Adnan Pachachi, for 
ratification by a simple majority of Iraq’s citizens.79 The final text was a compromise: rather than 
affording Kurdistan an explicit veto, the text provided Kurdistan with a de facto veto over the 
ratification of the permanent constitution under the two-thirds rule (given the location of three 
governorates within the borders of Kurdistan: Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimania). The Kurds’ revised veto 
rule is described as ‘a brilliant move’ drafted into the TAL in the final days before the deadline for a 
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deal.80 Debate ensued on Shi’a and Sunni positions on the TAL and the ratification rule of the 
permanent constitution. According to Ali Allawi, Sunni Arab negotiators accepted the rule as a means 
to limit Shi’a power and to block a constitution perceived as against their interests.81 It appears that 
it was only once the TAL had been accepted by the Iraqi Governing Council that the Shi’a elites 
objected to the rule.82 Critiquing the rule, Arato writes that it suited the constitutional preferences of 
one community, the Kurds, and finalized ‘a definition of Iraq as a voluntary union of two ethnically 
defined peoples.’83 But though the rule may have been inserted into the interim constitution at the 
behest of Kurdish elites, it also facilitated a Sunni Arab veto given their dominance in at least three 
governorates.84 Yet even if the rule might be understood as ‘difference-blind’, its application was far 
from neutral. As Sunni Arabs failed to muster the required threshold in one governorate, the 
constitution was weak in legitimacy for the previously dominant group who had existential fears 
about their position in a federal Iraq. The referendum appeared to fuel violent conflict, further 
isolating Sunni Arabs from the political process.85 
 
The variable degree of support for the constitution, particularly the overwhelming opposition on the 
part of Sunni Arabs, can be explained by the groups’ divergent constitutional preferences that were 
not fully accommodated in the rushed, imposed constitution-making process led by the CPA.86 The 
Kurds were in the positive position of having secured the recognition of Kurdistan in a federal Iraq 
and a guarantee that constitutional reform would not take place without their consent. O’Leary lists 
the achievements secured by Kurdistan in the constitution including ‘extraordinary regional status’, 
control over security, natural resources and most policy areas and a potential referendum to bring 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the Kurdistan Region.87 In contrast, the Shi’a community 
preferred the creation of a centralized Iraq, unsurprising given their status as the majority group. Their 
preference for a centralized Iraq according to Shi’a religious values was vehemently opposed by 
Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and secularists throughout Iraq. Sunni Arabs, largely excluded from the process, 
also supported a centralized Iraq, their preference understood to be ‘mostly ethnocentric in nature and 
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based on nostalgia for the Iraq that Sunni Arabs controlled since its creation.’88 A few years later, 
however, some Sunni Arabs were supportive of federalism, exploring the possibility of forming their 
own region to counter the consolidation of Shia power.89 
 
Exploring the potential for the groups in Iraq to act as ‘peoples’ engaged in a constitutional moment, 
we need to consider the nature and strength of divisions between Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. 
As Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield write, viewing Iraq as ‘starkly divided into three internally 
coherent and mutually hostile groups’ might be ‘an oversimplification of a complex reality’ but has 
some ‘obvious truths’ given Sunni Arab dominance of the state. 90  Following decades of 
discrimination, oppression and genocidal acts perpetrated against them by the Iraqi state, the Kurdish 
population have a long-standing, deep-rooted identity and continue to strive for self-government. 
Regional autonomy was viewed by Kurdistan leaders as the minimal level of acceptable self-
determination short of independence.91 As McGarry and O’Leary put it, it is ‘very unlikely that 
victims of state policies of ethnocentrism, discrimination, ethnic expulsion, and genocide’ would 
accept the alternative vision of an integrated, centralized Iraq.92 In addition to the ethnic divide 
between Kurds and Arabs, Shi’a-Sunni divisions constitute a crucial political divide along sectarian 
lines.93 Marginalization in post-invasion Iraq has fostered the development of a specifically Sunni 
identity in the face of an ascendant Shi’a identity. The emergence of hostile myths and a security 
dilemma between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs quickly led to the mobilization of group identity and 
ultimately civil war.94 Aside from this struggle for power, the Shi’a-Sunni divide does not concern 
an alternative to the Iraqi state. It is therefore appropriate to talk of two (Kurd and Arab) peoples with 
divergent constitutional preferences, acknowledging the regional and religious divisions between 
Shi’a and Sunni. Given the relative concentration of the groups in the governorates, it was arguably 
appropriate for a liberal qualified majority rule to protect groups’ interests in the referendum. Yet the 
inclusion of such a rule without consensus among the groups hampered the prospects for the 
referendum to fully legitimate the new constitution. 
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Conclusions  
To what extent can the referendum facilitate the ‘voice’ of multiple groups in a deeply divided society 
transitioning to power sharing? If power sharing is based on the consent of the contending groups, 
can referendum rules provide for concurrent majorities? The article began with the optimistic 
projections of Blair and Bush: the former UK Prime Minister characteristically heralding the 
referendums on the GFA as a 'giant stride' toward peace and former US President bravely framing 
the ratification of the Iraq Constitution and subsequent elections as a 'turning point' for Iraq and the 
Middle East. The path to peace in Northern Ireland has turned out to be a bumpy affair as successive 
cross-community coalitions lurched from one crisis to the next, leading to the collapse of power 
sharing in 2017. Iraq has been wracked by civil war, violence and destruction waged by ISIS, and 
little evidence of elite cooperation. Though referendum design is not an explanation for these 
outcomes, the two cases highlight the challenging dynamics of employing direct democracy in 
divided places transitioning from conflict. 
 
When included in a post-conflict or transitional institutional design process, the referendum performs 
a crucial legitimation role. Particular care must be taken on referendum rules as they bring to the fore 
'the people' dilemma and the variable support between groups engaged in the constitutional moment. 
Normatively speaking, the referendum can help demonstrate consent, facilitating the agency of voters 
who collectively bring into being (or not) a polity they will govern together as shared constitutional 
authors. The Northern Ireland case shows that a simple majority threshold may be sufficient provided 
that the deal sufficiently addresses the groups' preferences and is likely to secure majority support 
from the main communities. What comes before the referendum in the context of institutional design 
is therefore crucial. Yet a simple majority threshold may not be acceptable to one or more groups and 
efforts should be made to facilitate concurrent majorities. In situations where a minority is 
geographically concentrated in an administrative unit, a qualified majority in the country plus a 
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majority in a region or regions may be required. As shown in Iraq, deciding on the rules for a qualified 
majority that will be supported by all main groups will be tricky but it is vital that they support the 
rules. Establishing legitimate rules is particularly important where external actors employ a heavy 
hand in the process. To enhance legitimacy, decisions on ratification must not be rushed and should 
form part of an inclusive and ideally consultative process. It is also important to consider the 
implications of variable support for the settlement. As both Northern Ireland and Iraq show, the deal 
may be weak in legitimacy for the previously dominant group. Peace implementation must therefore 
address groups' ongoing political preferences and seek to increase support from the group(s) who 
registered their weaker support. In highlighting these dynamics, the article points to two principal 
avenues for research. For power-sharing theory, it will be important to further investigate the role of 
ratification, and in particular the referendum, for the ‘adoptability’ of power-sharing arrangements.95 
There is also potential for further research on the capacity of institutional design processes in conflict-
affected states to provide opportunities for meaningful public participation, thereby enhancing the 
overall legitimacy of the elite-negotiated deal and the new political system.  
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